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to virtual devices and HMIs, attacks were implemented against this virtual system. Uses
for this laboratory include both SCADA security research and pedagogy. The laboratory
serves research purposes, as it utilizes industry standard SCADA communication
protocols as well as commercial HMIs, and is capable of interfacing with physical
SCADA equipment, and is also capable of producing volumes of industrial control
system traffic. It also serves pedagogical purposes as several laboratory exercises were
developed in conjunction with the simulators to demonstrate the workings of cyberphysical security in a classroom environment.

DEDICATION
Soli Deo Gloria

ii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
First, I would like to thank Dr. Thomas Morris for his vision and assistance in this
project, which was central to its success. Second, I would like to thank Bradley Reaves
and David Mudd for the original impetus of the project. Third, I would like to thank the
staff of DASI for their support. Fourth, I would like to thank the Thornton family (Steve,
Judi, Tyler, Brad, Katie, Joel, and Daisy), without whose contributions this work could
not have been achieved. Fifth, and lastly, I thank my Creator, Sustainer, and Redeemer,
Jesus Christ, from whom I derive my existence, and to whom this work is dedicated.
This work was supported both by the National Science Foundation Secure and
Trustworthy Cyberspace program under Grant No. 1315726, and by the Pacific
Northwest National Laboratory, under U.S. Department of Energy Contract DE-AC0576RL01830.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
DEDICATION.................................................................................................................... ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS............................................................................................... iii
LIST OF TABLES............................................................................................................. vi
LIST OF FIGURES .......................................................................................................... vii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS............................................................................................ ix
CHAPTER
I.

INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................1
1.1
1.2

II.

Motivation..............................................................................................1
Contribution ...........................................................................................5

BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORKS ...................................................7
2.1

SCADA Systems Background ...............................................................7
2.1.1 Sensors & Actuators ........................................................................7
2.1.2 Controllers........................................................................................8
2.1.3 Human Machine Interfaces ..............................................................9
2.1.4 Supervisory Controls .......................................................................9
2.2
Related Work .......................................................................................10
2.3
Gas Pipeline Process ............................................................................14
III.

LABORATORY FRAMEWORK ...................................................................16
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
3.5
3.6

IV.

Component Overview ..........................................................................16
Process Simulation...............................................................................16
Controller Simulation...........................................................................18
HMI......................................................................................................25
Attacks .................................................................................................29
Laboratory Exercises ...........................................................................33

MATLAB MODEL .........................................................................................35
4.1

Integration ............................................................................................35
iv

4.2
4.3

V.

Expansion.............................................................................................41
Comparison ..........................................................................................43
4.3.1 Normal Operation ..........................................................................43
4.3.2 Startup Operation ...........................................................................45
4.3.3 Attack Operation............................................................................46

CONCLUSIONS..............................................................................................48
5.1
5.2

Contributions........................................................................................49
Future Work .........................................................................................50

REFERENCES ..................................................................................................................52
APPENDIX
A.

LABORATORY INSTRUCTIONS ................................................................55
A.1

Setup ....................................................................................................56
A.1.1 RTU................................................................................................57
A.1.2 HMI................................................................................................60
A.1.3 ATTACKER ..................................................................................62
A.1.4 Simulink Simulation ......................................................................64
A.1.4.1RTU VM ..................................................................................64
A.1.4.2Windows 7 VM........................................................................66
A.1.5 GE HMI .........................................................................................68

v

LIST OF TABLES
3.1

Modbus TCP Frame Format ............................................................................23

3.2

Captured Modbus TCP Frame .........................................................................24

4.1

Navier Stokes Variables...................................................................................36

4.2

Hydraulic Motor Properties .............................................................................39

vi

LIST OF FIGURES
2.1

Purdue Reference Model..................................................................................10

2.2

Laboratory Systems and HMIs ........................................................................11

3.1

Ladder Logic....................................................................................................20

3.2

Ladder Logic Emulation ..................................................................................21

3.3

Pipeline Pressure Comparison .........................................................................22

3.4

VDEV Communication Capture ......................................................................24

3.5

SNORT Log Entry ...........................................................................................25

3.6

GE iFix HMI ....................................................................................................26

3.7

Python TkInter HMI ........................................................................................27

3.8

TkInter HMI Control Options..........................................................................27

3.9

Reconnaissance Attack Response ....................................................................31

3.10

Altered Control Set Point Attack .....................................................................32

4.1

Initial Simulink Design ....................................................................................38

4.2

Simulink Pipeline Communications ................................................................40

4.3

Expanded Simulink Simulation .......................................................................41

4.4

Expanded HMI.................................................................................................42

4.5

Physical Process Normal Operation.................................................................44

4.6

Python System Normal Operation ...................................................................44

4.7

Simulink System Normal Operation................................................................45

4.8

System Startup .................................................................................................46
vii

4.9

Python and Simulink Simulations Under Attack .............................................47

A.1

Open Virtual Machine......................................................................................57

A.2

Network Connections.......................................................................................58

A.3

Editing Connection ..........................................................................................59

A.4

PLC Simulation................................................................................................60

A.5

HMI Graphics ..................................................................................................61

A.6

Attack Script ....................................................................................................64

A.7

Configuration File............................................................................................65

A.8

Run Script ........................................................................................................66

A.9

Local Area Connection Properties ...................................................................67

A.10

Simulink Simulation ........................................................................................68

A.11

iFix Startup.......................................................................................................69

A.12

iFix HMI Driver...............................................................................................70

A.13

iFix HMI ..........................................................................................................71

viii

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
HMI - Human Machine Interface
ICS - Industrial Control System
IDS - Intrusion Detection System
PID - Proportional Integral Derivative
PLC - Programmable Logic Controller
SCADA - Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
VDEV - Virtual Programmable Logic Controller Device
VM - Virtual Machine

ix

INTRODUCTION

1.1

Motivation
Critical Infrastructure is a term used by such federal agencies as the Department

of Homeland Security to describe assets, systems, and networks that are vital to United
States national economic security, national public health, and national public safety [1].
Although this definition is broad, typically it includes assets like hydro-electric dams,
power generation facilities, power transmission and distribution facilities, oil and gas
refineries, water treatment facilities, and other such assets.
These assets are vital for a number of reasons. They are responsible both for
power used for by home-owners to heat their homes, and for power used by radar stations
to detect intercontinental ballistic missiles. Critical Infrastructure assets are responsible
both for the facilities used to purify water for every-day consumption, as well as water
pumping stations used in the event of a nuclear meltdown of a nuclear power plant.
Nearly every Critical Infrastructure asset contains a cyber element as well as a physical
process element. The cyber element of most modern critical infrastructure contains some
type of control system used for such things as control of the power generation process,
control of the oil refining process, etc. These control systems are known as Industrial
Control Systems (ICS). They are also known as Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition (SCADA) systems. These will be referred to hereafter as SCADA systems.
1

Because these SCADA systems are computerized, they are subject to similar cyber
vulnerabilities as other computer systems. In February 2013, President Barack Obama
issued an executive order stating that “the cyber threat to critical infrastructure continues
to grow and represents one of the most serious national security challenges we must
confront” [2].
In order to counter this cyber-threat to critical infrastructure, research into the
defense of SCADA systems must be conducted. Typically, this means research into
SCADA system vulnerabilities and possible cyber intrusion vectors in order to detect and
counter these intrusions. This sort of analysis of vulnerabilities requires extensive
experimentation and can produce unexpected behaviors in the system. Given the critical
nature of the assets in question, it is not feasible to conduct this research on the assets
directly, as any unexpected behavior could result in damage to the assets that are being
protected. Instead, elements of the control systems are implemented in a laboratory
setting. By this means, the computerized elements of a SCADA system can be networked
together and run in isolation or attached to a laboratory scale model of the physical
process (pumping stations, water storage, gas pipeline, etc.). Examples of such models
are further described in background section of this work.
There are many benefits to such a SCADA research laboratory. Not only is such
an environment is more amenable to examination, communication protocols can
examined and exploited, internal workings and behaviors of SCADA devices can be
explored, and the modeled physical process response to an intrusion can be measured
without fear of destroying critical infrastructure. Also, because actual SCADA
equipment can be procured identical to what is used in live critical infrastructure
2

processes, the behaviors of both will be the same. Thus vulnerabilities discovered in the
laboratory will match vulnerabilities in the live system.
Although there are many benefits to a laboratory SCADA environment as
described, there are also many short comings. The first is that such an environment is
cost-prohibitive. The cost of an entire control system as used by a single power plant
could be as high as tens of millions of dollars. Even a simple control system for a
laboratory might cost several thousand dollars. The cost of authentic physical equipment
as is used in critical infrastructure processes (pumps, valves, drives, etc.) is much higher.
A second, related shortcoming is that because of the cost of such an environment,
expansion is equally difficult as procurement. Both of these are significant as researchers
are often confronted with economic shortages and must rely on inexpensive methods and
low-cost tools. Thirdly, these systems are not easily distributable. Given their size and the
complex setup, relocating a system requires dismantling and reassembling which is both
difficult and expensive. Thus if laboratory tools are too expensive to individually obtain,
and too difficult to distribute and share, many researchers will not be able to utilize these
tools. Lastly, given the high cost of physical process components, small-scale models
have to be used in their place. Because of the large number of complex interactions
within the physical processes (e.g. the crude oil refining process within one distillation
column is the combination of multiple pumps, valves, pressure and temperature sensors,
drums, tanks, boilers, separators, as well as steam, crude oil, and other chemicals [3]),
only a few parts of the process are modeled. Because of the simplification involved, the
information gathered regarding the physical process response to a cyber-intrusion is
diminished.
3

To address these difficulties, simulators are often used in the place of physical
hardware. Virtual simulations have several advantages over a physical SCADA
laboratory. First, simulators are inexpensive relative to physical hardware, often on the
order of hundreds rather than thousands of dollars. Second, simulators are expandable. It
typically takes little reconfiguration and incurs few addition costs to expand a virtual
simulation. Third, these simulations are easily distributable. For open-source simulations,
the entire simulation and necessary executables can be transmitted digitally to fellow
researchers. This is similarly true for proprietary simulations, assuming fellow
researchers have access to the proprietary simulation environment. Fourth, simulations
are capable of a higher fidelity process modeling than a laboratory scale physical model.
Not all process simulations are more faithful to the intricacies of the physical process
than a small scale-model, but the capability is present given an understanding of the
mathematics that describe the physical processes.
However, simulators are faced with an inverse set of difficulties from a physical
SCADA hardware laboratory. The most significant of these is that accurately modeling
SCADA hardware functionality is difficult. Most current simulators emulate portions of
functionality, but not the entire device. Since most SCADA hardware devices are
computerized, they include microprocessors with unique firmware specific to that
processor, as well as programming specific to the control scenario in which the device is
placed (e.g. controlling a boiler, distillation column, pipeline, etc.), and a programming
environment atop the processor firmware so that a user can program the device for use in
live controls. Without reverse engineering a SCADA device, it is difficult to know how
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the device will respond given certain intrusion vectors. While this can be done, it is
beyond the scope of most current simulators.
In addition to this, most current simulators are segmented into different use
categories, all outside of SCADA cyber-security. Some exist in the process modeling
sector for examining novel process innovations, others exist for SCADA device
modeling, but these are for training purposes or programming experimentation. More of
these are described in the related works section of this thesis.
What is needed is a simulator that accurately simulates both the cyber element of
the Critical Infrastructure assets, as well as the physical processes element, while
understanding the limits of both, and is tailored to cyber-security research needs.
1.2

Contribution
In light of these difficulties, the following hypothesis is set forth:
It is possible to
1. Build a virtual SCADA laboratory from pre-existing research components
2. Tailor such a laboratory for cyber-security research purposes
3. Expand such a laboratory with increasingly accurate modeling
4. Use such a laboratory in a pedagogical environment
The first clause states that such a SCADA laboratory could be built, and from

components of other researchers. The research of Brad Reaves [4] and Wei Gao [5] will
form a baseline for the formation of this virtual SCADA laboratory. The second clause
describes what sets this laboratory apart from other commercial simulations and models
in that the design of this laboratory is for cyber-security purposes. All other functionality
of the laboratory will be secondary to this goal. The third clause is important because this
5

work, much like that of [4] can be used as a base for other researchers to expand and
improve. The fourth clause demonstrates that this laboratory will also be a useful tool in
teaching the concepts of SCADA security to students in this field.
This thesis describes a system that combines the benefits of both physical system,
and the simulators described. It closely models the behavior of real systems, but it is
easily expandable. It is designed with SCADA modeling in mind, and can incorporate
other simulators. It also benefits from being open source, so that further development by
other researchers is simple.
The following chapters provide further detail on how this work contributes to
solving the described problem. Chapter 2 gives a more thorough description of SCADA
systems as a background and discusses related works. Chapter 3 describes the system
architecture and functionality. Chapter 4 describes expansion of the system, and Chapter
5 provides conclusions and a discussion on future work.
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CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORKS

2.1

SCADA Systems Background
Most modern industrial processes, such as paper and plastic manufacture, oil and

gas refinement, power generation, and many other such processes, are controlled by
specialized systems known as Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)
systems. These systems are made of numerous components, which can be broken down
into 4 major categories: Sensors & Actuators, Controllers, Human Machine Interfaces,
and Supervisory Controls
2.1.1

Sensors & Actuators
First, at the lowest level are sensors and actuators. Sensors are electro-mechanical

devices; the physical phenomenon has a mechanical effect on the sensor, and the sensor
translates this into an electrical signal. This electrical signal can then be transmitted
directly to a controller as a fluctuation in current, or it can be translated directly by the
sensor into a digital signal. Sensors include gauges, calipers, transmitters, and other
measurement devices. Actuators are physical devices controlling and manipulating the
process itself. Actuators receive a signal from a controller, either binary or a percent of
range, and adjust their state accordingly, which affects the state of the process. Actuators
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include valves, pumps, drives, and other similar physical devices. Sensors and actuators
are the only devices in a SCADA system that directly interface with the physical process.
2.1.2

Controllers
Secondly, there are the controllers themselves. These are special purpose

computer systems that interface with the sensors, implement custom control logic, and
control actuators based upon the control logic and system state. These devices typically
operate in a loop which involves at least 4 steps. The first step is to read data from the
sensors. This is often an analog to digital conversion, depending on how the sensors
communicate. The second step is storing new data in internal memory. The internal
memory blocks are referred to as Registers. The third step is the calculation of new
values. Controllers are often programmed using a language known as Ladder Logic, due
to the visual resemblance to rungs of a ladder. Each “rung” of the ladder, which
represents a line of program logic, is stepped through by the controller, and new values
are calculated from the logic
The fourth step is transmitting outputs. Output registers are translated into analog
signals, relay states are changed, and digital signals are transmitted. Distributed
controllers also include a network communications interface which connects to upstream
systems including the supervisory control layer and Human Machine Interface (HMI).
Distributed controllers include programmable logic controllers (PLC), programmable
automation controllers (PAC), and intelligent electronic devices (IED).
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2.1.3

Human Machine Interfaces
Thirdly, there are the Human Machine Interfaces, or HMIs. These are the

interface by which the human operator of the process can control the process. HMIs
typically have a graphical illustration of the process, including the actuators and other
process equipment. The operator can input particular set points for physical states, such
tank level, flow rate, pressure, etc., and these set points will be given to the controller to
maintain. In many modern systems, the HMI is a software installation on standard PC
hardware. The HMI communicates either directly with controllers, or indirectly via the
supervisory control layer.
2.1.4

Supervisory Controls
Lastly, there are the supervisory controls. These are the systems that engineers

typically interface with, and are used for storing process data, computing coordinated
control between systems, as well as for programming the controllers themselves. Modern
supervisory controls are typically implemented on standard PC Server hardware.
A graphical representation of how all of these work together is shown below in
Figure 2.1 [7]. This is often called the "Purdue Reference Model" for Process Control [8]

9

Figure 2.1

2.2

Purdue Reference Model

Related Work
The test bed described in [6] is typical of small scale research environments

which use commercial industrial equipment to implement model SCADA SYSTEMS.
The test bed is consists of 7 systems including a gas pipeline, storage tank, water tower,
industrial blower, assembly line conveyor, steel rolling process, and a chemical mixing
system. Figure 2.2 below shows pictures of physical systems and HMI screens from the
test bed in [6].
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Figure 2.2

Laboratory Systems and HMIs

The Idaho National Labs (INL) National SCADA Test bed is a research facility
that is designed to evaluate control systems representative of those used in the United
States critical energy infrastructure [9]. INL works with industry and government
agencies to research current issues in control system cyber security. The 890 square mile
Critical Infrastructure Test Range at INL is built for accurate modeling of physical
systems, and is built with industrial scale components, such as sensors, actuators,
automation systems, human machine interfaces, and more.
Sandia National Laboratory's National Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
Test Bed is a test bed sponsored by the Department of Energy's Office of Electricity
Delivery and Energy Reliability (OE). Similar to INL, Sandia's test bed is designed to
research the effect of cyber intrusion. Their efforts range from autonomous agent systems
11

applied to SCADA, to cryptographic security, system assessment, and red-team activities
[10]. Sandia's lab is also capable of actual power generation and power system loading
for research into how attacks affect these components.
Adam Hahn et al. describe a test bed which models two electric substations
connected to a control center, using industry HMIs, a soft RTU, and physical
overprotection relays and autotransformers [11].
The British Columbia Institute of Technology (BCIT) possesses a facility that
contains a fully operational distillation column, evaporator and power boiler. In addition
to these, they utilize well known ICS PLC equipment, as well as industry standard
instrumentation to accurately simulate the internal workings of a small scale industrial
facility.
While these systems have manifold research uses, they all face the same
difficulties. First, they are not easily portable. Such systems are large, fragile, and not
easily disassembled. This makes distribution of these systems to other researchers
infeasible. Secondly, the cost of such systems makes acquisition or expansion of such
systems an economic difficulty.
In [12], Bela Genge et al. propose a framework based on Emulab and Simulink to
recreate cyber components and physical processes for a security analysis of network
industrial control systems. They propose in their paper a novel architecture that strikes a
balance between experiments that consist entirely of physical components, such as [6],
and experiments with entirely simulated components. They describe a set of required
functionalities for cyber-physical experimentation. This list includes supporting a wide
range of physical processes, supporting real malware/SCADA software, supporting high
12

fidelity cyber/physical layers, and supporting typical network industrial control system
components. While the proposed architecture of their paper is helpful in envisioning a
successful framework for SCADA experimentation, no realization of this framework is
discussed in the paper.
In [13], Mahoney and Gandhi describe SCADASiM, a frame work for SCADA
simulation. SCADASiM was written for the purpose of simulating legacy SCADA
systems in order to facilitate regulatory compliance monitoring. It allows rapid recreation
of messages between the cyber-systems and physical systems so that these messages can
be analyzed for compliance with various regulatory agencies. While they describe having
a control system simulation of a water supply system, the paper focuses on the framework
for monitoring the communications for compliance, and not on the simulation itself.
Adamo, Attivissimo, Cavone, and Giaquinto discuss a SCADA/HMI system built
specifically for advanced educational courses in [14]. They describe their framework using
National Instruments LabVIEW for process simulation/HMI, and Allen Bradley’s
RSLogix Emulate for PLC emulation. While the system described suites a SCADA
pedagogical environment, the focus of their research is not cyber-security of SCADA
systems. Also, because LabVIEW is a tool optimized for control and display, there are
limitations on the scale and complexity of physical process simulations.
An industrial control system testbed is also described by in Haihui Gao et al. [15].
In it, the authors discuss a testbed built using Matlab/Simulink to model the physical
process, a group of non-descript PLCs, and an emulated network testbed. While this
architecture could be “inexpensive, useful, realistic, measurable, controllable, and
reusable”, it still requires the use of physical PLCs which is neither inexpensive nor
13

reusable as a virtual system. Also, scant details are given regarding the architecture and
functionality of the testbed, so comparisons of this testbed with others is difficult.
In [16], Reaves and Morris describe an open virtual test bed for industrial control
system security. This simulation, built in Python as both a process simulator and a PLC
Emulation, was designed to be interoperable with commercial SCADA equipment. This is
accomplished by implementing realistic SCADA communication protocols, closely
imitating functionality of PLC programming, and the physical behavior of the systems
described in [6]. This work by Reaves and Morris is the foundation for the work described
in this Paper.
There are many simulators for both PLC and process simulation, such as those
available from Rockwell Automation [17], Mathworks Simulink [18], MHJ Software,
Modellica [19], and many others that are of commercially available. These are each
significant for their modeling capabilities in their respective fields. However, none of
these are designed for entire SCADA system modeling, and would require custom tools,
not currently available, to create a comprehensive virtual SCADA system for cybersecurity.
2.3

Gas Pipeline Process
In the testbed environment described in [6], there is a laboratory scale model of a

gas pipeline. There are 7 major components of the gas pipeline lab model; an HMI, a
master PLC, a slave PLC, an air compressor, a solenoid valve, a pressure sensor, and
network of pipes. The operation of the pipeline is as follows: From the HMI, a user sets
the mode system, either manual (MAN), automatic (AUTO), or off (OFF). The control
14

mode is also set by the user from the HMI, either pump control (PUMP) or solenoid
control (SOL). The pressure set point of the system is also set by the user from the HMI.
In OFF, the system remains off with the compressor not running and the solenoid
valve shut. . In MAN, the pump and valve will only open when the user manually
opens/closes the valve or turns on/off the pump from the HMI. In AUTO, the PLC will
attempt to maintain pressure set point by either opening/closing the valve in SOL control
mode, or by turning on/off the pump in PUMP control mode.
These settings are written to the master PLC from the HMI using the
MODBUS/RTU serial protocol. From here, the master PLC writes these values to the
slave PLC using MODBUS/ASCII over a wireless radio. The Slave PLC is connected
directly to the sensor, solenoid, and compressor.
This physical process is used as a basis for the process simulation described in
chapter 3.

15

LABORATORY FRAMEWORK

3.1

Component Overview
Described in this section is a virtual simulation laboratory modeled after the gas

pipeline process described in Chapter 2. Three of the four components described in the
Background section comprise this virtual laboratory; a simulation of a gas pipeline
process (sensors and actuators), a PLC simulation, and an HMI. Also included are attack
and detection systems. Each piece of the laboratory can be run in a separate virtual
machine (VM). This makes maintenance of the systems easier such that when errors
occur, the system can easily be restored to a previous working state. It also means that a
virtual network can be utilized across the VMs without having to procure network
equipment. Thus all network traffic between the VMs is real network traffic that can be
logged, disrupted, and modified as in a physical system.
3.2

Process Simulation
The simulation of the physical processes forms the base component of this

laboratory. In real world control systems, the process itself is typically a
physical/chemical/mechanical phenomenon that is to be measured and controlled. The
process is usually described by complex sets of multi-order differential equations.
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For this gas pipeline simulation, the components modeled were a gas pump and a
solenoid release valve. There are 4 scenarios that are modeled for changes to the pressure
of system:
1. If the compressor is compressing and the valve is closed, the pressure will
indefinitely rise.
2. If the compressor is not compressing and the valve is open, the pressure
will fall until it reaches zero.
3. If the compressor is compressing, and the valve is open, the pressure will
rise, to an equilibrium pressure.
4. If the compressor is not compressing and the valve is closed, the pressure
will remain constant.
A simulation model developed is a curve-fitted model of the system described by
Morris et al [6]. Data was taken from the model, and equations were derived from this
empirical data. For the first 2 states described above, the derived equations are quadratic.
These are shown in the equations below where “t” represents time, relative to the current
state, and “p” represents pressure:
p = 2.0052 ∗ 𝑡 2

(3.1)

𝑝 = 0.098 ∗ 𝑡 2 − 4.439 ∗ 𝑡 + 49.83

(3.2)

The third state is modeled using a piecewise model, such that the pressure will
converge to an equilibrium pressure, around 7.8. This value was discovered empirically
from the system described in [6]. The third equation describes the response as the
pressure rises to 7.8, and the fourth describes the response once the pressure exceeds 7.8.
17

The rand function below represents a Python uniform random number between -0.02 and
0.01:
𝑝 = 𝑡 ∗ (0.77319 − 0.0210857 ∗ 𝑡) + 0.151637

(3.3)

𝑝 = 7.3 + 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑(−0.02,0.01)

(3.4)

The fourth state requires no equation, as the pressure remains constant in this
state.
These equations are implemented in a Python script, and are executed as a
separate process that is running continuously. It receives updated commands for the
actuators from the virtual controller, and sends updates on the current state of the system
to the controller.
3.3

Controller Simulation
A central part of this laboratory is the simulation of the PLC hardware and

software. In real world systems, a typical PLC controller is programmed to perform 4
steps in an infinite loop: read inputs, analyze current state, calculate responses, and write
outputs. This process is what the controller simulation seeks to emulate.
Reading inputs in a PLC usually involves converting an analog signal, stemming
from a sensor input, into a digital signal and writing this value to an internal storage unit,
called a register. The VDEVs communicate with the process simulator by emulating the
analog and digital communication received from sensors and actuators. The response is
calculated, and this is sent back to the process simulator. The format used for interfacing
the process simulator is JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) attribute-value pairs. This
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was chosen by the original architect, Bradley Reaves, for simplicity and debugging
purposes [20]. Future plans for simulator communication are discussed in Chapter 5.
Once this is done, the current state of the system is analyzed. All processes
controlled by PLCs have a user defined “set point". This is the desired state of the
process. In the gas pipeline case, this would be a desired pressure in PSI. The PLC
determines the current state of the system by calculating distance from set point, which is
known as error. Once this is done, the PLC calculates the response by 2 different
mechanisms; either a continuous or a discrete response. Continuous responses are
calculated when a value between 0-100% is needed. These are typically calculated by a
set of mathematical algorithms known as Proportional Integral Derivative (PID)
mathematics. Discrete responses are usually much simpler (such as ON/OFF,
OPEN/CLOSE), and are set in the presence/absence of error. PLCs are programmed to
analyze the current state using a language known as "Ladder Logic". It is called this
because each individual program in the PLC, as described above, resembles rungs on a
ladder. An example of ladder logic from Mississippi State University’s SCADA
Laboratory [6] is shown below in Figure 3
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Figure 3.1

Ladder Logic

The virtual PLC devices (VDEVs) in this laboratory simulates the behavior of the
PLC ladder logic of the lab described in [6] and control the gas pipeline process
described as closely as possible, within the confines of Python programming. Each data
read, calculation, and output setting takes place one at a time, emulating each rung of the
PLC logic.
The ladder logic emulation of the logic found in MSU’s SCADA lab is shown
below as Figure 3.2
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Figure 3.2

Ladder Logic Emulation

Because real ladder logic can be described as a series of conditional statements
based on the state of inputs, this Python program emulates ladder logic by means of a
series of IF/ELSE statements, given the state of the inputs. The execution of this logic is
an emulation of the Gas Pipeline logic of the systems described in [6]. As can be seen
above, this portion of the ladder logic shows a part of the implementation of the PID
math used to calculate the response of the pump and valve.
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Finally, the response of the PLC is written to a set of output registers, which are
then converted to an analog signal, and sent to an actuator. This is done using the same
emulation as the input operations.
The similarity of the controlled operation of physical system compared to the
controlled operation of the virtual system can be seen below in Figure 3.3 [16]

Figure 3.3

Pipeline Pressure Comparison

The VDEVs communicate with other virtual devices over MODBUS/TCP by
utilizing the modbus_tk Python libraries. Modbus is a protocol developed by Modicon in
1979 to for “master-slave/client-server communication between intelligent devices” [21].
Table 3.1 below dissects a MODBUS/TCP frame into individual components and gives a
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functional description of these parts, as described by the Modbus Organization in their
official MODBUS messaging guide [22].
Table 3.1

Modbus TCP Frame Format

Name
Transaction Identifier

Length
2 Bytes

Protocol Identifier

2 Bytes

Length Field

2 Bytes

Unit Identifier

1 Byte

Function Code

1 Byte

Data Bytes

n Byte(s)

Function
Identification of a
MODBUS Request /
Response transaction
0 = MODBUS
protocol
Number of following
bytes
Identification of a
remote slave
connected on a serial
line or on other
buses.
Function code of the
command/response
Data being
transmitted, either a response
or a command.

Using MODBUS/TCP enables the VDEVs to communicate with external devices
such as physical PLCs and HMI using a standard SCADA communication protocol. It
also allows researchers and students to view, capture, analyze, and route the traffic just as
in real SCADA systems. The implementation of MODBUS/TCP within this simulation is
indistinguishable from MODBUS traffic of real SCADA devices. Comparing the
MODBUS/TCP standard with actual MODBUS/TCP traffic occurring between the
VDEV and an external SCADA device, in this case an HMI, demonstrates that the VDEV
communication is indistinguishable from a physical MODBUS device. Figure 3.4 below
demonstrates a Wireshark capture of said communication.
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Figure 3.4

VDEV Communication Capture

As can be seen, Wireshark identifies the traffic as MODBUS/TCP and recognizes
the attributes of a MODBUS/TCP packet. These attributes are given below as Table 3.2:
Table 3.2

Captured Modbus TCP Frame

Name
Transaction Identifier
Protocol Identifier
Length Field
Unit Identifier
Function Code
Data Bytes

Contents
3
0
6
4
3
8 Words

The captured packet is indeed MODBUS/TCP, as is indicated by the Protocol
Identifier field containing 0. The packet is of length 6, communicating with device 4,
utilizing function code 3 (which is the Read Holding Registers function code), and
expecting a response of length 8 words.
This indistinguishability is also demonstrable by having an IDS capture all
MODBUS traffic between the VDEV and an external SCADA device, such as an HMI.
This was done using the SNORT IDS. Because SNORT has pre-configured rules for
detecting various communication protocols, including MODBUS/TCP, an instance of
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SNORT was run with SNORT logging any MODBUS/TCP traffic. The results are shown
below in Figure 3.5.

Figure 3.5

SNORT Log Entry

This figure shows an entry in the SNORT system log. The first line of this figure
shows that an event was logged in compliance with the “Modbus TCP- Response
#Detected” rule. Time, date, IP addresses, and TCP information regarding the transaction
are also given. What is evident from this figure is that SNORT sees this VDEV->HMI
traffic as typical MODBUS traffic.
3.4

HMI
The third critical component of the laboratory is the HMI. As is the case in any

SCADA system, an HMI is needed to visualize the changing process and interface with
the control system. For this laboratory, 2 separate HMIs were utilized. The first was
developed using GE's iFix product. This is identical to the gas pipeline HMI at MSU’s
SCADA laboratory. Figure 3.6 below demonstrates the gas pipeline HMI screen.
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Figure 3.6

GE iFix HMI

The pipeline depicted is a representation of the pipeline shown in Figure 2.2. Both
the digital pressure gauge and the analog gauge represent the current pressure of the
system. The mode and system mode options are selectable using the top 2 buttons on the
right sight. The second row of buttons are for use in manual mode. The bottom 2 icons
are indicator lights, showing the status of the pump and valve. The set point of the
system, as well as several other control options are alterable from a second page of this
HMI. This HMI is useful for SCADA security research in that GE’s iFix product is a
widely used SCADA HMI product. However, since the GE software is proprietary, and
therefore not easily distributable, a second HMI was developed using the Python TkInter
libraries for use in distributed laboratories and research. Figure 3.7 below demonstrates
this HMI.
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Figure 3.7

Python TkInter HMI

As can be seen in the upper left corner of Figure 3.7 above, there are a number of
control options. These are magnified below in Figure 3.8.

Figure 3.8

TkInter HMI Control Options

The set point of this system represents the pressure in PSI that the VDEV will
attempt to maintain. The Gain, Reset, and Rate terms are configurable options of the
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Proportional Integral Derivative (PID) algorithm that is used to calculate actuator
responses. While it is outside the scope of this thesis to discuss the specifics of these
terms, they are essential to the proper functioning of every SCADA system and must be
individually set for every actuator of a process being controlled. The mode of the system
is also configurable. In OFF, the system remains off. In manual (MAN), the compressor
and valve will only open on user request, as seen by the last two buttons. In automatic
(AUTO), the VDEV will attempt to maintain set point by opening/closing the valve, as
well as turning on/off the compressor. The control mode will change whether the system
in AUTO opens/closes the valve, or turns on/off the compressor to maintain set point.
While these HMIs appear different, one primary way in which they are the same
is the communication method they use. Both use MODBUS/TCP to request data from
and write data to a PLC. All the data being displayed comes from a MODBUS read
request to a PLC, and changes made by the user are translated into MODBUS write
requests. Thus, the reads and writes from the HMI appear across the network, as is shown
in Figure 3.4.
One primary difference is that upon receiving data from the PLC, the iFix HMI
has a separate process database in which it stores the data. The iFix software uses Visual
Basic to render the graphics, thus the Visual Basic display polls the iFix database in order
to display the data. In the TkInter HMI, the interface between the PLC and the HMI is
written in Python as another function of the Python code. Thus, there is no additional
database in the TkInter HMI, as all variables are stored within the scope of the Python
execution. Another difference is that of user authentication. While iFix provides a
mechanism for user authentication, the TkInter developed HMI does not.
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Such differences are significant, as vulnerabilities can be exposed in the iFix HMI
that affect real SCADA industries. By contrast the TkInter HMI was developed within the
scope of this research, such that unrealistic HMI vulnerabilities could be introduced and
discovered that do not affect SCADA industries. Because either commercial or
experimental HMIs can be used, both major industry HMIs and developmental HMIs can
be ported to this laboratory and tested for vulnerabilities. Research like that of Dr.
Wesley McGrew in analyzing HMI vulnerabilities can take place without requiring
access to a physical SCADA laboratory [23].
3.5

Attacks
In order to research the patterns and attack vectors of malicious activity, cyber-

attacks were developed against the virtual laboratory SCADA systems. Attacks
developed against the system include attacks such as reconnaissance attacks, command
injection attacks, and denial of service attacks.
The specific attacks implemented against this virtual system are based on the
work of Dr. Wei Gao, a doctoral graduate of Mississippi State University [24]. In his
dissertation, Dr. Gao describes 28 attacks developed against the physical SCADA
systems described in [6]. Of these 28 attacks, 3 were specifically chosen to be
implemented in this SCADA laboratory; a reconnaissance attack, a command injection
attack, and a denial of service attack. These attacks were ported from a serial
implementation of MODBUS to MODBUS/TCP and were implemented on a separate
virtual machine on the same virtual network as the VDEV and the HMI.
Reconnaissance attacks are a category of attacks used by attackers to gain
information about the control system before any destructive activity can take place. Such
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information can include device manufacturer, model number, supported network
protocols, system address, and a system memory map. Most of this is necessary in
preparation for a more serious attack. In order to successfully attack an SCADA system,
the attacker must possess critical system information such as;
a.

What kind of system is being attack?

b. What protocol are the devices on the network using?
c. What are the addresses of the devices on the network?
d. How do these devices store critical information?
Command Injection attacks are another category of attacks used by attackers.
Command Injection attacks utilize information gathered in reconnaissance to maliciously
adjust settings within the SCADA system. One way to attack such a system is to
impersonate a SCADA client, inject a command into the system by sending the command
to the server, and modify settings such as set point, PID parameters, valve state, and
others.
A Denial of Service (DOS) attack is another type of attack used against SCADA
systems. In a denial of service attack, the attacker seeks to interrupt network
communication by any means possible. This often takes place through network traffic
flooding, commands that require significant processing time, sending malformed data,
and other methods.
The reconnaissance attack implemented was an Address Scan. The
MODBUS/TCP variant of the MODBUS protocol distinguishes itself from other
protocols by its exclusive use of TCP port 502. Most MODBUS devices are built using a
client/server architecture, where each MODBUS device acts as both server and client. If
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the MODBUS server receives a MODBUS request on port 502, even one that is in error,
the server will respond from port 502. This is a clear indicator of the existence of a
MODBUS device. In addition to this, all MODBUS protocols have device number, 1255. Therefore, an attacker has to know the IP address and the device number of a
MODBUS device. In the implemented Address Scan attack, the attacker will send a
request to every MODBUS device from 1 to 255 at a particular IP address requesting to
read a particular holding register. If a MODBUS response is received, the attacker knows
that a MODBUS devices exists at that address. Below is a response from the VDEV to
the attacker in Figure 3.9

Figure 3.9

Reconnaissance Attack Response

The highlighted portion of this TCP packet is the data field of this packet. From
the official MODBUS messaging guide [22], the 83 indicates a MODBUS/TCP error, and
the 04 indicates exception code 4, a server failure. To an attacker, this information is
valuable. While this indicates no MOBUS device exists with this device number, because
a MODBUS/TCP error was received, this means that a MODBUS device exists at this IP
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address. If a device with this device number existed at this IP address, the server would
have responded with either a different error, or a response to the attacker’s request.
The implemented Command Injection attack is called an Altered Control Set
Point attack. In this attack, the attacker purports to be a MODBUS device with a unique
MODBUS device number, acts as a client, and send a command to the server to alter the
set point of the system. The server receives this response as any authentic command,
alters the set point, and begins adjusting the process actuators to achieve this new set
point. This attack, as well as the previous Device Scan attack, is possible due to the lack
of authentication within the basic MODBUS specification. Thus, any malicious device
can purport to be a legitimate MODBUS device, establish a connection with a server, and
inject malicious commands into the system. An execution of this attack is shown below
as Figure 3.10

Figure 3.10

Altered Control Set Point Attack
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The figure above is taken system data before, during, and after an attack. The blue
line represents the gas pressure in PSI, and the red line represents the set point in PSI. To
the left of the red peak shows the pressure and set point prior to the attack. The set point
is at 5PSI, and the pressure oscillates around 5PSI. The red peak represents where the
attacker began injecting new set points into the system. The increase and decrease of
pressure is due to the system responding to the new set points. The region to the right of
the peak represents the end of the attack.
A denial of service attack was developed specifically for this laboratory. In it, the
attacker floods the virtual PLC with packets of pseudo-random data every 100ms, such
that the PLC cannot respond to any other device due to the overwhelming amount of
network traffic. This causes the HMI software to timeout, and cannot be restarted until
the attacker ceases transmitting.
3.6

Laboratory Exercises
In conjunction with this laboratory, a set of 4 laboratory exercises were developed

for student classroom use.
In the first laboratory session, an overview is given of critical SCADA concepts.
This includes discussion of process components (sensors, actuators, controllers HMIs,
etc.), a brief discussion of the MODBUS protocol, and a short discussion of
virtualization. After this introduction, the student is walked through the initial setup
procedure for the virtual lab. Once the virtual lab is set up, the student is given 3
exercises to demonstrate the functioning of the HMI and the gas pipeline. These involve
modifying the set point, considering steady-state pressures of the system, considering
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maximum and minimum pressures due to pump/valve characteristics, and increasing
pressure until an over-pressure alarm is activated.
In the second laboratory session, a more thorough discussion of the MODBUS
protocol is given. This involves dissecting a MODBUS/TCP packet and examining what
each bit represents. It also includes discussion of a crucial security flaw in the protocol:
lack of authentication. The student is then expected to compose 3 attacks of their own
involving reconnaissance, command injection, and denial of service. Once written, the
student is expected to implement these attacks against the system from lab session 1 and
answer questions about the effect of their attacks.
In the third laboratory session, a discussion of common distinctions of IDSs is
given, a discussion on the SNORT IDS, as well as a dissection of a SNORT IDS rule.
Once this is complete, the student is expected to write 3 rules to defend the system from
lab session 1 against the attacks from lab session 2.
The fourth lab session is meant to demonstrate the effect of distributed controls.
This is done by first explaining the basics of PID math. Next, the student is expected to
implement the PID algorithm within the HMI, as opposed to within the PLC. Then a
DOS attack is implemented in both scenarios, and the benefits of a distributed control
system are illustrated.
These exercises were written to be used in future classes on cyber-physical system
security.
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MATLAB MODEL

4.1

Integration
As was stated in chapter 3, the physical processes in real world control systems

are a physical/chemical/mechanical phenomena usually described by complex sets of
multi- order differential equations. Specifically, the inter-relationship of pressure,
temperature, velocity, and density of fluids in motion is often approximated by a set of
equations known as the Navier-Stokes equations [25]. These are given in the equations
below as well as a Table 4.1 listing the variables:
δρ
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δ(ρw)
+ δx + δy + δz
δt

(4.1)

=0

δ(ρv)
δ(ρuv)
δ(ρ𝑣2 )
δ(ρvw)
+ δx + δy + δz
δt

= −

δρ
1 δτ
+ Re ( δx𝑥𝑦
δy
𝑟

+

δτ𝑦𝑦

δ(ρvw)
δ(ρv)
δ(ρuv)
δ(ρ𝑣2 )
+ δx + δy + δz
δt

= −

δρ
1 δτ
+ Re ( δx𝑥𝑦
δy
𝑟

+

δτ𝑦𝑦

δ(ρw)
δ(ρuw)
δ(ρvw)
δ(ρ𝑤2 )
+
+
+
δt
δx
δy
δz
Δ(𝐸𝑡 )
δt
1
Re𝑟

+
δ

δ(u𝐸𝑡 )
δx

+

δ(v𝐸𝑡 )
δy

+

δ(w𝐸𝑡 )
δz

= −

(δx (𝑢τ𝑥𝑥 + 𝑣τ𝑥𝑦 + wτ𝑥𝑧 ) +

δ
δy

δ(uρ)
δx

= −

−

δ(vρ)
δy

δρ
1
δτ
+ Re ( δx𝑥𝑧
δz
𝑟

−

δ(wρ)
δz

−

1

35

δq
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Table 4.1

Navier Stokes Variables

Coordinates
Velocity Components
Time
Pressure
Density
Stress
Total Energy
Heat Flux
Reynolds Number
Prandtl Number

x,y,z
u,v,w
t
p
ρ
τ
Et
q
Re
Pr

Although the equations above are often approximated for simulation and
computation, it can easily be seen that the simple quadratic equations given in the
previous chapter are not sufficient for a more complex study of the behavior of a physical
process during a cyber-attack.
While such equations could be programmed using the Python programming
language, and the complex interactions of fluids with mechanical devices such as pumps
and valves could be simulated, native Python is not designed to support such complex
mathematics. Also, having to hand code the equations with each new simulation is an
unnecessary step if other researchers and designers with expertise in this field have
already done so.
Simulink was chosen as a replacement process modeling tool due to its popularity
as an engineering design and research tool. SimHydraulics is a Simulink package that is
designed to provide components libraries for modeling and simulating hydraulic systems,
including models of components such as pumps, valves, actuators, pipelines, and other
hydraulic components. Not only does SimHydraulics include preconfigured models of
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these components, but also supports the use of custom components using the Simscape
language [26].
Initially, a system very similar to the system described in [6] was built in
Simulink. A simple system that included a pump, a valve, a pipeline, and a fluid was
included. In the physical system of [6], the source of the fluid was air from the
compressor (in the field of fluid dynamics, air is considered a fluid [27]). Because
Simulink requires a source, and open air is not an option, a reservoir of non-descript fluid
was chosen as the source of the fluid. Figure 4.1 below shows the initial design of the
system in Simulink.
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Figure 4.1

Initial Simulink Design

Not pictured in Figure 4.1 are the conversions from a physical signal to a
Simulink signal, the angular velocity source for the motor, and other necessary Simulink
components. As a part of the simulation, each component was modeled with properties
specific to the nature of the component. Table 4.2 below demonstrates the properties of
the Hydraulic Motor
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Table 4.2

Hydraulic Motor Properties
5 in3/rev
0.92
0.8
100 PSI
188 RPM
18 cSt

Motor Displacement
Volumetric Efficiency
Total Efficiency
Nominal Pressure
Nominal Angular Velocity
Nominal Kinematic Viscosity

In Table 4.2, The Motor Displacement indicates the volume of fluid displaced per
revolution. The Volumetric Efficiency refers to the percentage of fluid that flows out of
the pump. The Total Efficiency number is the volumetric efficiency, taking into account
the mechanical efficiency of the pump (taking into account the pressure and speed of the
particular pump). Nominal Pressure, Nominal Angular Velocity, and Nominal Kinematic
Viscocity are the rated pressure, angular velocity, and kinematic viscosity of the motor,
respectively, as would be given by the designers. These represent the expected operating
conditions of the pump. Each component of the pipeline has similar properties required
for simulation. For purposes of this simulation, these properties were left as the Simulink
default. Further discussion of modification of these is given in the future work section.
Because the state of the pump and valve are to be controlled by the VDEVs, the
Simulink model must communicate with the VDEVs. Simulink also contains libraries for
communicating using UDP packets. The communications for this simulated pipeline are
shown below in Figure 4.2
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Figure 4.2

Simulink Pipeline Communications

The rate limiters and zero-order holds seen above ensure the rate of UDP
transmission and the rate of data from the actual pipeline are compatible. The ASCII
value conversions are used to convert the commands received from the VDEV into
binary values for opening/closing the valve and turning on/off the pump. Each of the 3
values (pump, valve, and pressure) from the simulation are sent to a different UDP port
and each command from the VDEV is received on a different UDP port. As discussed
earlier, the VDEVs communicate with the process simulator by sending JSON attributevalue pairs. Because of the difficulties of text processing in Simulink, an interface was
written in Python to operate between the VDEV and the Simulink model. This interface
receives the JSON attribute-value pairs, strips the plain text attribute portion, and sends
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each command from the VDEV to a specific UDP port. It also receives each individual
value sent from Simulink, formats the values to be sent as 1 attribute-value paired UDP
packet, and sends this to the VDEV.
4.2

Expansion
As described in the motivation section of this thesis, the purpose of creating

virtual SCADA testbeds is to model the cyber model of national critical infrastructure.
Modeling 1 pump, 1 valve, and 1 PLC is helpful, but does not achieve the goal of
modeling a large scale critical infrastructure asset and control system. To move toward
this goal, the original Simulink system was further expanded to include 2 pumps and 2
valves. Between the 2 valves is a pipe that spans a distance of 3km. This expanded
system is shown below as Figure 4.3

Figure 4.3

Expanded Simulink Simulation
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The additional pump can be seen in the middle of the figure, and the second valve
at the rightmost edge of the figure. The communications section of the Simulink model
was also expanded, but is not shown here.
In addition to this expanded simulation, an additional VDEV was used to control
the second pump valve. In order to display these additional components, the Python HMI
was also modified. This is shown below in Figure 4.3.

Figure 4.4

Expanded HMI

As can be seen, there are two sets of pump/valve/controls. The first set to the left
are controlled by the first VDEV and essentially represent the original pump and valve.
The second pump represents a much larger valve, due to the distance of 3km in the
simulation, at the end of which lies the second valve. The second pump/valve are
controlled by the second VDEV. Both VDEVs are an implementation of the logic
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described in Chapter 3 and seek to control the pressure at the valve by opening/closing
the valve or turning on/off the pump.
4.3

Comparison
To observe the fidelity of the simulations, both the Python and Simulink

simulations were compared against the physical model. Normal behavior, as well as
startup and attack behaviors are compared and contrasted.
4.3.1

Normal Operation
Figures 4.5, 4.6, and 4.7 show the physical, Python, and Simulink systems

operating under normal behavior. The setpoint of all 3 systems is 15 PSI, the time range
is 4 minutes, and the pressure scale is 0-25 PSI. The choice of 15 PSI was chosen because
it is within the range of the physical compressor, and is sufficiently high to be suitable for
viewing the differences. The 4 minute time window was chosen due to the physical
limitations of the compressor. Because the physical process consists of 1 pump and 1
valve, the single pump/valve Simulink simulation was used for comparison. The solid
line represents the 15PSI setpoint.
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Figure 4.5

Physical Process Normal Operation

Figure 4.6

Python System Normal Operation
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Figure 4.7

Simulink System Normal Operation

As can be seen, the pressure changes in the Simulink simulation much more
closely resemble the physical system that the Python simulation does. While the Python
simulation could be modified to more closely resemble the physical model, this would
require modifying the equations described in Section 3.2. Whereas in the Simulink
model, a more intuitive change to the speed of the pump, the efficiency of the pump, the
size of the valve, or other physical properties can alter the pressure response of the
system.
4.3.2

Startup Operation
The behavior of the systems during startup is shown below as Figure 4.8, with the

physical system, Python simulation, and Simulink simulation startup shown, respectively.
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Figure 4.8

System Startup

Again, it can be seen, the stair step increase and initial overshoot of the physical
model is more closely replicated by the Simulink model than by the Python model.
4.3.3

Attack Operation
Figure 4.14 below compares the Python simulation to the Simulink simulation

under this attack. The graph has been rescaled to 0-100PSI in order to accommodate the
higher pressures of the system while under attack.
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Figure 4.9

Python and Simulink Simulations Under Attack

Because the physical system is not capable of achieving the pressures this
injection attack requests, it is not included. However, this comparison still demonstrates
advantages of the Simulink simulation in that it can achieve much higher pressures than
the Python with a simple change, as opposed to empirically remodeling the system.
In all three of these cases, normal operation, startup, and under attack, the
Simulink simulation proved a more faithful and intuitive simulation than the Python
simulation.
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CONCLUSIONS

The Virtual SCADA Laboratory described in this thesis is useful tool for research
in the field of SCADA cyber security. It was built by modeling small scale industrial
processes, modeling commercial PLC programming, employing the widely used
MODBUS/TCP network protocol, and utilizing popular commercial HMIs. The process
simulation was improved by adding a Simulink model of a pipeline. Not only does this
addition increase the fidelity of the process model, it decreases the difficulty of
modifications to the model, and more easily supports a larger model. This Simulink
model is also much more readily modifiable and replicable by researchers in diverse
fields.
The system also has been tested interfacing with physical commercial SCADA
devices, such as PLCs and HMIs. Attacks against this system have been developed that
exploit the weaknesses of the MODBUS protocol, and are included in the laboratory. As
well as attacks, detection rules have been developed for the included attacks which were
developed using the SNORT intrusion detection system.
This laboratory is capable of producing volumes of MODBUS traffic, both
normal and malicious, for research in intrusion detection, anomaly detection, and
machine learning. It is also a useful tool for teachers in the cyber-physical system
classroom. It contains an easily distributable and demonstrable introduction to SCADA
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processes and systems, attack and defense methods, as well as thorough laboratory
walkthroughs explaining essential concepts.
5.1

Contributions
In the introduction of this thesis, the following contributions were set forth:
It is possible to
1. Build a virtual SCADA laboratory from pre-existing research components
2. Tailor such a laboratory for cyber-security research purposes
3. Expand such a laboratory with increasingly accurate modeling
4. Use such a laboratory in a pedagogical environment
It has been shown that by utilizing the research of Brad Reaves in his building a

virtual testbed comprised of virtual devices and process emulations [4], by utilizing the
research Wei Gao in his developing attacks against the physical laboratory system [5],
and by modifying Reaves’ system, a virtual SCADA laboratory was built.
It has also been shown that by focusing on fidelity of the systems for the purpose
of cyber security, such as how the system responds to an attack, how the communications
are vulnerable, how the VDEVs respond to an attack, and by including Gao’s attacks, that
the system is tailored for cyber security research.
By replacing the original, curve fitted Python model of the processes with a
Simulink model of the processes, it has been shown that the laboratory can be modified
toward increasing fidelity. By expanding this simulation to include an additional pump,
valve, and VDEV, it has been shown that the laboratory is easily expandable.
Finally, by creating laboratory exercises that are geared for use in a classroom, it
has been shown that such a laboratory can be used in a pedagogical environment. The
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laboratory has been submitted to 2 universities for use in courses on Cyber-Physical
System Security, further demonstrating the usefulness of this lab.
5.2

Future Work
This simulation is based primarily on the system described in [6], having 1 PLC

controlling 1 pump and 1 valve, and was expanded to include 2 pumps, 2 valves and 2
virtual PLCs. Current efforts include expanding this system to include a network of
virtual PLC devices controlling a larger gas pipeline system with multiple gas pumping
stations. These efforts also include developing attacks against this larger system and
examine the response of such a distributed system to a cyber-attack.
Because the implementation of MODBUS/TCP within this laboratory is
indistinguishable from MODBUS traffic of real SCADA devices, large volumes of
authentic SCADA traffic can be collected. Using the attack described, as well as further
developed attacks in conjunction with normal operations, datasets of malicious and nonmalicious SCADA network traffic can then be created. Such datasets are useful in the
field of intrusion detection research to detect patterns in malicious network behavior, as
was done Dr. Justin Beaver, and Dr. Raymond Borges-Hink [28]. Development of such
datasets is ongoing.
Considering the complexity of the design of the VDEVs, and that the Ladder
Logic emulation does not resemble actual ladder logic in appearance or in simplicity, it is
also desirable to replace these simulations with ladder logic simulations that not only
emulate the functionality of ladder logic, but also the appearance and programming
simplicity. Further development to replace the ladder logic emulation of Reaves in [4]
with a system that more closely resembles Ladder Logic is ongoing.
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At present, the communication between the Simulink simulation and the VDEVs
takes places using JSON attribute-value pairs over UDP packets. This method does not
resemble what is used by industrial sensors. Future work is planned to replace this
communication method with a protocol used by industrial sensors, such as
WirelessHART or ZigbeePro.
Also, the specific properties of each components of the Simulink models was left
as the Simulink default. Further research is planned to more precisely model the specific
characteristics of these components to more closely resemble the equipment used in the
respective industrial processes, such as gas pipeline.
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APPENDIX A
LABORATORY INSTRUCTIONS
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A.1

Setup
This lab was setup using several VMWare virtual computers using Fedora 19.

These virtual machines should be provided.
First, these virtual machines should be setup for use in VMWare. Download the
VMWare Player (http://www.vmware.com/products/player/) and follow the installation
instructions provided. The free version installation file should be near the bottom of the
webpage. Be sure and download at least Version 6 of VMWare Player, as previous
versions are incompatible.
Next, copy the provided virtual machine folders to a suitable location on the
computer in use. Once this is done, unzip the two files provided. These files should be
compressed in .rar files. Most Windows distributions now come with WinRAR (also
available at http://www.rarlab.com/). Use this to unzip the files by right clicking them
and choosing "extract here". After this, open VMWare Player and select the option to
"Open a Virtual Machine". Select the .vmx file for the VM RTU, as shown below in
Figure A.1
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Figure A.1

Open Virtual Machine

This should add the RTU VM to VMWare Player. Do the same for all the
provided VMs
A.1.1

RTU
Once these virtual machines have been added, boot the RTU machine by clicking

"RTU" and then "Play Virtual Machine". When VMWare asks whether you moved or
copied this file, choose "I moved It". If VMWare asks about installing VMWare tools,
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choose the "Remind Me Later" option, as these have already been installed. The
password for user "user" and root (super user "su") is "password", no quotes. Once this
VM has booted, make sure the IP settings are correct for this simulation. This may be
done by clicking Fedora menu icon in the lower left corner, then navigating to
"Preferences" and "Network Connections", as shown below in Figure A.2

Figure A.2

Network Connections

From here, select the "Wired 1" connection and click edit. It should be the only
connection, though it may have another name. Navigate to the IPV4 settings page. The IP
address should be "10.128.0.6". If it is not, click IP address and modify it to the correct
address and set the IP address to "10.128.0.6", the subnet mask to "255.0.0.0", and the
gateway to "10.0.0.1". Then click Save. This is shown below as Figure A.3
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Figure A.3

Editing Connection

Next, click the Terminal icon in the lower left hand corner. It should look like a
blank computer screen. Once the Terminal has opened, navigate to the simulation
directory by inputting the following command
cd ZAXmastertestbed/trunk/scripts/
Once at this directory, begin the process/PLC simulation by starting the run shell
script
./run.sh
This will startup the process/PLC simulation. Note that the [sudo] password is
"password". 2 new terminal windows should open, as seen below in Figure A.4.
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Figure A.4

A.1.2

PLC Simulation

HMI
After this, boot the HMI VM in the same manner as the RTU VM. Again, when

VMWare asks whether you moved or copied this file, choose "I Moved It". If VMWare
asks about installing VMWare tools, choose the "Remind Me Later" option, as these have
already been installed. The login password for the ""user" login should be "password".
Once this VM has booted, make sure the IP settings are correct for this simulation. Select
the "Wired Connection 1" connection and click edit. It should be the only connection,
though it may have another name. Navigate to the IPV4 settings page. The IP address
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should be "10.128.0.4". If it is not, click IP address and modify it to the correct address
and set the IP address to "10.128.0.4", the subnet mask to "255.0.0.0", and the gateway to
"10.0.0.1". Next, click the Terminal icon in the lower left hand corner. It should look like
a blank computer screen. Once the Terminal has opened, navigate to the simulation
directory by inputting the following commands
cd ZAXmastertestbed/trunk/ZaxGraphics/
Once at this directory, open the graphics by starting the python graphics
sudo python pipelineGui.py
This will start up the HMI. A graphics page should open as seen below in Figure
A.5

Figure A.5

HMI Graphics
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This display consists of a few items: A gas pump used for pump gas from one
location to another (bottom left), a solenoid release valve used for releasing gas when the
pressure is too high (in this case to the air, middle bottom), and the control options (top
left). The rectangular portion is for recirculation of the air.
The function of the gas pipeline is such: When in automatic mode (AUTO), the
PLC controller will communicate with the compressor and valve to keep the pressure at
setpoint. When in manual mode (MAN), the compressor will turn on/off when the user
turns it on/off, and the valve will open/close when the user tells it to open/close.
The user can also select between the pump control method and the solenoid
control method. These control methods are only for AUTO mode. In PUMP control, the
controller will turn on the compressor to compress the pressure up to setpoint, and turn
off the compressor to reduce the pressure down to setpoint, while opening the solenoid
valve. In SOLENOID control, the compressor will stay on, and the solenoid valve will
close to pump the pressure up to setpoint, and open the valve to reduce the pressure down
to setpoint.
The Gain, Reset, and Rate options are parameters used for tuning the speed of the
controls, known as PID parameters.
A.1.3

ATTACKER
Boot the ATTACKER machine by clicking "ATTACKER and "Play Virtual

Machine". When VMWare asks whether you moved or copied this file, choose "I Moved
It". If VMWare asks about installing VMWare tools, choose the "Remind Me Later"
option, as these have already been installed. The password for user "user" and root (super
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user "su") is "password", no quotes. Once this VM has booted, make sure the IP settings
are correct for this simulation. Select the “Wired Connection 2" connection and click edit.
It should be the only connection, though it may have another name. Navigate to the IPV4
settings page. The IP address should be "10.128.0.2". If it is not, click IP address and
modify it to the correct address and set the IP address to "10.128.0.2", the subnet mask to
"255.0.0.0", and the gateway to "10.0.0.1". Then click Save.
Next, click the "Activities" pull down menu, and select "Terminal". Once the
Terminal has opened, navigate to the simulation directory by inputting the following
command
cd ZAXmastertestbed/trunk/scripts/
Once at this directory, begin the attack simulation by starting the run shell script
./attack.sh
This will startup the attack simulation. Note that the [sudo] password is
"password". A terminal window should open, as seen below in Figure A.6
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Figure A.6

Attack Script

From here, each of the 3 attacks discussed can be run by entering the appropriate
character. Each should be run one at a time, and any additional terminal windows opened
should be closed after the attack is complete.
A.1.4
A.1.4.1

Simulink Simulation
RTU VM
In order to use the Simulink Simulation instead of the Python simulation, go to

the RTU VM. Navigate in the file browser to
ZAXmastertestbed/trunk/sims/tcppipe
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Open the “mkconfig.py” file in a text editor. Scroll to the bottom of the file. Edit
the IP Address on the “recipients” line, which should be line 338. Change this from
“10.128.0.6” to “10.128.0.5”. This is shown below as Figure A.7

Figure A.7

Configuration File

Open a terminal window and navigate to
ZAXmastertestbed/trunk/sims/tcppipe
Now, enter the command
sudo python mkconfig.py
Now, in the file browser, navigate to
ZAXmastertestbed/trunk/scripts
Open the “run” script in a text editor. Comment out line 28 by using a pound sign,
as shown below in Figure A.8
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Figure A.8

Run Script

Now, execute the run script as before by entering ./run.sh into a terminal window
at the directory
ZAXmastertestbed/trunk/scripts
A.1.4.2

Windows 7 VM
Boot the Windows 7x64 machine by clicking “Windows 7x64” and "Play Virtual

Machine". When VMWare asks whether you moved or copied this file, choose "I Copied
It". If VMWare asks about installing VMWare tools, choose the "Remind Me Later"
option, as these have already been installed. There should be no password for the user
Once this VM has booted, make sure the IP settings are correct for this simulation.
Select the “Local Area Connection" connection from Control Panel -> Network
and Sharing Center -> and edit it by selecting it, going to “Properties” and TCP/IPv4
Properties. The IP address should be "10.128.0.5". If it is not, click IP address and
modify it to the correct address and set the IP address to "10.128.0.2", the subnet mask to
"255.0.0.0", and the gateway to "10.0.0.1". Then click OK on all screens. This is shown
below as Figure A.9
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Figure A.9

Local Area Connection Properties

From here, navigate to the desktop and open the “Pipeline” folder. Find the file
called “updreceive.py”. Right click, and select “Open with Idle”. Once this is open, press
the F5 key. It should open an Python window and an exe window, as shown below in
Figure A.10
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Figure A.10 Simulink Simulation

This starts the Simulink simulation and the communication module for
communications between Simulink and the Virtual PLC.
A.1.5

GE HMI
In order to use the GE iFix HMI instead of the TkInter HMI, boot the Windows

XP machine by clicking “Windows XP Professional” and "Play Virtual Machine". When
VMWare asks whether you moved or copied this file, choose "I Moved It". If VMWare
asks about installing VMWare tools, choose the "Remind Me Later" option, as these have
already been installed. There should be no password for the user. Once this VM has
booted, make sure the IP settings are correct for this simulation.
Select the “Host Only" connection from Control Panel -> Network Connections > and edit it by right clicking it, clicking “Properties” and TCP/IP Properties. The IP
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address should be "10.128.0.3". If it is not, click IP address and modify it to the correct
address and set the IP address to "10.128.0.3", the subnet mask to "255.0.0.0", and the
gateway to "10.0.0.1". Then click OK on all screens.
Next, go back to the desk top and double click the iFix 4.5 button. Then click the
iFix icon at the upper left corner, as shown below in Figure A.11.

Figure A.11 iFix Startup

This should bring up an iFix startup box. When asked about “No Key Detected”,
click Continue. While iFix continues to boot, go to the desktop and click the MBE Power
Tool icon. Once this loads go to File->Open and select the “TCP-VirtualSCADADriver”
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from C:\Program Files\GE Fanuc\Proficy iFix. Then click the green start button. This is
shown below as figure A.12

Figure A.12 iFix HMI Driver

Finally, return to the HMI. It should be operating correctly, as shown below in
Figure A.13
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Figure A.13 iFix HMI
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